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Comment 
PERPETUATING INJUSTICE: ANALYZING THE MARYLAND 
COURT OF APPEALS’S REFUSAL TO CHANGE THE COMMON 
LAW DOCTRINE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
ANDREW WHITE∗ 
A dinosaur roams yet the landscape of Maryland . . . feeding on 
the claims of persons injured by the negligence of another, but 
who contributed proximately in some way to the occasion of his 
or her injuries, however slight their culpability.  The name of that 
dinosaur is the doctrine of contributory negligence.1 
 
The modern perception that contributory negligence is a “dinosaur” re-
flects the fact that it was created in a different era.2  In 1809, Lord Ellen-
borough, Chief Judge of the King’s Bench, created the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence, simultaneously incorporating it into the common law of 
England.3  Under contributory negligence, a plaintiff is completely barred 
from recovering damages in a negligence suit when he or she fails to use 
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 1.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n, 432 Md. 679, 695, 69 A.3d 1149, 1158 (2013) (Harrell, J., dis-
senting).  Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, “[a] plaintiff cannot recover damages if 
the plaintiff’s negligence is a cause of the injury.  The defendant has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff’s negligence was a cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”  
MD. STATE BAR ASSOC., MARYLAND CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 19:10 (5th ed. 
2018). 
 2.  See DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, NEGLIGENCE SYSTEMS: 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, COMPARATIVE FAULT, & JOINT & SEVERAL LIABILITY 11 (2013) 
(describing the early eighteenth-century origins of contributory negligence). 
 3.  Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 61, 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B. 1809) (announcing 
the creation of the doctrine of contributory negligence: “One who is injured by an obstruction in a 
highway against which he fell, cannot maintain an action if it appear that he was riding with great 
violence and want of ordinary care, without which he might have seen and avoided the obstruc-
tion.”). 
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ordinary care and is an immediate and proximate cause of his or her injury.4  
At first glance this seems fair—negligent plaintiffs are barred from recov-
ery.  However, contributory negligence does not account for the proportion-
ate fault of each party.  A plaintiff who is only slightly negligent will be 
completely barred from recovery, even when the defendant is primarily re-
sponsible for the accident.5  A good example is a jaywalker who tries to 
cross an intersection late at night and is hit by a driver who is speeding, has 
his headlights off, and runs a red light.  Under contributory negligence, the 
jaywalker is completely barred from recovery because he was negligent in 
unlawfully crossing the street, even though the speeding driver who ran the 
red light is arguably more at fault for the accident. 
In 1847 the Court of Appeals of Maryland incorporated contributory 
negligence into the common law of Maryland.6  At the time, “[c]ontributory 
negligence was [being] adopted throughout the United States.”7  States 
adopted contributory negligence for primarily two reasons: (1) to protect 
“fledgling” industry from “plaintiff-minded” juries and (2) the popular “no-
tion” that “courts should not assist someone who contributes to causing his 
or her own injuries.”8 
Despite its initial popularity, by the mid-twentieth century, legislators 
and judges across the country realized that contributory negligence harshly 
denies recovery to persons who have only slightly contributed to their inju-
ries.9  Forty-six states, by either judicial enactment or statute, replaced con-
tributory negligence with the doctrine of comparative negligence, which 
apportions damages according to fault.10  Even England (the jurisdiction 
where contributory negligence was created), in 1945, abandoned contributo-
ry negligence in favor of comparative fault.11  Maryland, however, refuses 
to abandon contributory negligence and today remains one of five jurisdic-
tions in the United States that cling to this universally criticized, judge-
made common law rule.12 
                                                          
 4.  Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill 200, 205 (1847). 
 5.  Id. at 205 (“[A]lthough the defendant’s misconduct may have been the primary cause of 
the injury complained of . . . the plaintiff cannot recover.”). 
 6.  Id. at 205 (adopting the doctrine of contributory negligence as the law of Maryland). 
 7.  DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., supra note 2, at 11. 
 8.  Id.; Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n, 432 Md. 679, 697, 69 A.3d 1149, 1159 (2013) (Harrell, J., 
dissenting). 
 9.  See DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., supra note 2, at 3, 13–14. 
 10.  Id. at 14.  Comparative fault refers to a “system of apportioning damages between negli-
gent parties according to their proportionate shares of fault.  Under a comparative fault system, a 
plaintiff’s negligence that contributes to causing the plaintiff’s damages will not prevent recovery, 
but instead only will reduce the amount of damages the plaintiff can recover.”  Id. at 4. 
 11.  Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, c.28. 
 12.  See Coleman, 432 Md. at 682, 69 A.3d at 1150 (declining to abandon the common law 
doctrine of contributory negligence); see also DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., supra note 2, at 14 (“Cur-
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Whose responsibility is it to change an outdated, judge-made common 
law rule, like the doctrine of contributory negligence?  Historically, the 
courts and the legislature held concurrent power to change the common 
law13 and, given the fact that the common law is judge-made, the courts tra-
ditionally recognized that it was primarily their duty to change it.  As Chief 
Judge Jeremiah Chase of the Court of Appeals stated in 1821, “Whether 
particular parts of the common law are applicable to our local circumstanc-
es and situation, and our general code of laws and jurisprudence is a ques-
tion that comes within the province of the courts of justice and is to be de-
cided by them.”14 This attitude prevailed into the twentieth century.  In 
1951, the Court of Appeals stated, “[I]t is [the court’s] duty to determine the 
common law as it exists in this State.”15  Even as late as 1983, the Court of 
Appeals asserted its power to change a common law doctrine if the court 
found that a doctrine, “in light of changed conditions or increased 
knowledge . . . had become unsound in the circumstances of modern life.”16 
Starting in the early 1980s, however, the Court of Appeals began to 
create precedent which severely limited the traditional power of the state 
judiciary to change the common law.17  Most recently, in Coleman v. Soc-
cer Ass’n of Columbia,18 the Court of Appeals refused to change the com-
mon law doctrine of contributory negligence in light of the General Assem-
bly’s repeated refusal to do so.19  The court in Coleman viewed the General 
Assembly’s repeated failure to pass legislation aimed at changing the com-
mon law doctrine of contributory negligence as “very strong evidence” of 
legislative intent to retain the doctrine.20  The court reasoned that it should 
not change the common law contrary to legislative intent, since a “declara-
tion of the public policy” is “normally the function of the General Assem-
bly” and the General Assembly is “expressly empowered to revise the 
common law” by Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.21 
                                                          
rently, contributory negligence is the law in only five U.S. jurisdictions—Alabama, Maryland, 
North Carolina, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.”). 
 13.  See Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 341, 396 A.2d 1054, 1073 (1979) (noting that the com-
mon law may be changed by “legislative act” or “judicial decision”). 
 14.  State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 365–66 (1821).  See 1 JON L. WAKELYN, BIRTH OF 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 42–43 (Greenwood Press 2004) 
for Jeremiah Chase’s impressive resume and role in revolutionary Maryland. 
 15.  Ass’n of Indep. Taxi Operators v. Yellow Cab Co., 198 Md. 181, 204, 82 A.2d 106, 117 
(1951). 
 16.  Harrison v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 459, 456 A.2d 894, 903 
(1983).  
 17.  See infra Part I. 
 18.  432 Md. 679, 69 A.3d 1149 (2013). 
 19.  Id. at 695, 69 A.3d at 1158. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 689, 69 A.3d at 1155 (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 
422, 459, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983)). 
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This Comment will argue that the Court of Appeals should not view 
the General Assembly’s refusal to change or modify an outdated common 
law rule as a roadblock to judicial action.  The repeated failure of bills in 
the General Assembly is a poor indicator of legislative intent.22  Additional-
ly, the court should not defer to the legislature when it is considering a 
change to judicially created, common law rule.23  The Court of Appeals has 
the power to and should change a common law doctrine that has become 
“unsound in the circumstances of modern life.”24  Instead of deferring to the 
legislature, the court should evaluate the original rationale for the common 
law doctrine and the justifications offered for the doctrine’s “existence and 
continued viability.”25  When a common law doctrine does not withstand 
this scrutiny, the court should not hesitate to discard it.26 
This Comment is divided into two Parts.  Part I will examine the foun-
dation on which Coleman rests and a number of cases that are in contention 
with the court’s holding in Coleman.27  Part II will criticize the court’s deci-
sion in Coleman and argue that the court should change outdated and unjust 
common law doctrines, like the doctrine of contributory negligence, regard-
less of legislative inaction.28 
I.  BACKGROUND 
In Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals held that it should not change a common law doctrine in the face of 
the General Assembly’s repeated refusal to do so.29  This holding rests on 
two premises.  The first premise is that the common law should not be 
changed contrary to the intent of the General Assembly.30  The second 
premise is that the General Assembly’s repeated failure to pass legislation 
                                                          
 22.  See infra Section II.A. 
 23.  See infra Section II.B. 
 24.  Harrison, 295 Md. at 459, 456 A.2d at 903. 
 25.  Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 487–88, 830 A.2d 450, 466 (2003); see also McIntrye 
v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that “mindless obedience” to stare decisis 
can “confound the search for truth and foster an attitude of contempt” towards the courts). 
 26.  See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009) (“The doctrine of state decisis is of course 
‘essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law,’ but 
it does not compel us to follow a past decision when its rationale no longer withstands ‘careful 
analysis.’” (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003))). 
 27.  See infra Part I. 
 28.  See infra Part II. 
 29.  See Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n, 432 Md. 678, 695, 69 A.3d 1149, 1158 (2013) (“For this 
Court to change the common law and abrogate the contributory negligence defense in negligence 
actions, in the face of the General Assembly’s repeated refusal to do so, would be totally incon-
sistent with the court’s longstanding jurisprudence.”). 
 30.  See id. (“[T]he common law should not be changed contrary to the public policy of the 
State as set forth by the General Assembly.” (quoting Ireland v. State, 310 Md. 328, 331, 529 
A.2d 365, 366 (1987))). 
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aimed at changing a common law doctrine is strong evidence of a legisla-
tive intent to retain that doctrine.31  These premises, while supported by the 
majority of Maryland case law, are inconsistent with a number of Maryland 
cases.32  In many of these cases, the Court of Appeals held that the General 
Assembly’s repeated failure to pass legislation was not strong evidence of 
legislative intent.33  Additionally, in a number of these cases, the Court of 
Appeals changed outdated common law doctrines even when the General 
Assembly refused to act.34 
This Part will proceed in four Sections.  Section A examines the Court 
of Appeals’s traditional duty to change the common law.35  Section B ana-
lyzes how the Court of Appeals, starting in the early 1980s, began to defer 
to the legislature on common law issues.36  Section C looks at the Court of 
Appeals refusal to change the common law doctrine of contributory negli-
gence in Coleman.37  Finally, Section D highlights the cases in which the 
Court of Appeals changed the common law despite legislative inaction and 
the cases in which the Court of Appeals viewed legislative inaction as a 
weak indicator of legislative intent.38 
A.  The Court’s Traditional Power to Change the Common Law 
In Coleman, the Court of Appeals held that it should not change the 
common law contrary to legislative intent.  Traditionally, however, the state 
judiciary and the legislature held independent and equal power to change 
the common law.39  In fact, Judges often stated that changing the common 
law was primarily the duty of the courts.40 
For example, in 1821, Chief Judge Jeremiah Chase, in State v. Bu-
chanan,41 noted that the judiciary and the General Assembly held equal 
power to change the common law.42  In Buchanan, two officers of the Bank 
                                                          
 31.  See id. at 693, 69 A.3d at 1157 (noting that the General Assembly’s continual considera-
tion and failure to pass bills attempting to change the doctrine of contributory negligence “is a 
clear indication of legislative policy at the present time”). 
 32.  See infra Section I.D. 
 33.  See infra Section I.D. 
 34.  See infra Section I.D. 
 35.  See infra Section I.A. 
 36.  See infra Section I.B. 
 37.  See infra Section I.C. 
 38.  See infra Section I.D. 
 39.  White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354–55, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966). 
 40.  Ass’n of Indep. Taxi Operators v. Yellow Cab Co., 198 Md. 181, 204, 82 A.2d 106, 117 
(1951) (“[I]t is [the court’s] duty to determine the common law as it exists in this State.”). 
 41.  5 H. & J. 317, 365–66 (1821). 
 42.  See id. at 366 (noting the common law “may be abrogated or changed as the general as-
sembly may think most conducive to the general welfare” and that the judiciary has concurrent 
power to decide whether parts of the common haw have become “obsolete from non user or other 
cause”). 
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of the United States were charged with “conspiracy to cheat, defraud, and 
impoverish, the Bank of the United States, by appropriating the monies, 
promissory notes, and funds of the bank” to their own use.43  Chase found 
that these facts constituted the English common law offense of conspiracy44 
and that the common law of England, as it was understood at the adoption 
of the Maryland declaration of rights in 1776, was the law of the Maryland 
“without restraint or modification.”45  However, Chase noted that the com-
mon law could be changed, either by the legislature or the court.46  Chase 
explained that common law issues were questions that were to “be decided” 
by the “courts of justice,” but that the legislature held concurrent power to 
change the common law “so that no great inconvenience” would result from 
“the power being deposited with the judiciary to decide what the common 
law is, and its applicability to the circumstances of the state, and what part 
has become obsolete from non-user or other cause.”47 
This judicial philosophy continued to prevail in the mid- to late twen-
tieth century.  In the 1960 decision White v. King,48 the court asserted that 
both the judiciary and the legislature had the power to change a common 
law doctrine that had become “unsound in the circumstances of modern 
life.”49  In King, the court was asked whether “Michigan law was applicable 
to an action by Maryland residents against another Maryland resident for 
injuries received in an automobile accident [that occurred] in Michigan.”50  
The court applied the common law rule of lex loci delecti: that when an ac-
cident occurs in another state the rights of the parties, even if they are dom-
iciled in Maryland, “are to be determined by the law of the state in which 
the alleged tort took place.”51  The court found that stare decisis did not bar 
the court from changing the common law rule of lex loci delecti if it was 
convinced that the rule was “unsound.”52  However, because it found that 
lex loci delecti was not “unjust” the court decided to maintain the status quo 
and apply the law of Michigan.53  The court noted that the legislature also 
had the power to change the rule if it so desired.54 
                                                          
 43.  Id. at 367. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 365. 
 46.  Id. at 365–66. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966). 
 49.  Id. at 354, 223 A.2d at 767. 
 50.  Id. at 348, 223 A.2d at 763. 
 51.  Id. at 351–52, 223 A.2d at 765. 
 52.  Id. at 354, 223 A.2d at 767. 
 53.  Id. at 355, 223 A.2d at 767. 
 54.  Id. 
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In the 1979 decision, Pope v. State,55 the Court of Appeals continued 
to acknowledge that the common law could be changed by “judicial deci-
sion” or legislative act.56  In Pope, the Court of Appeals held that mispri-
sion of a felony was not a “chargeable offense” in Maryland, striking it 
from Maryland’s common law.57  Under the common law, a person was 
guilty of misprision of a felony if they knew of a felony and failed to report 
it.58  The Court of Appeals held the offense was no longer a part of the 
common law because of its “origin, the impractical and indiscriminate 
width of its scope, its other obvious deficiencies, and its long non-use.”59  
The court also noted that the legislature had the power to create a statutory 
offense for misprision of a felony if it so desired.60 
B.  The Court of Appeals Begins to Defer to the Legislature on 
Common Law Issues 
Starting in the early 1980s, however, the court began to view the Gen-
eral Assembly as the more appropriate forum for making changes to the 
common law and through precedent, diminished the courts traditional pow-
er to change the common law by promoting deference to the legislature.61  
In Condore v. Prince George’s County,62 the Court of Appeals decided to 
eliminate the common law doctrine of necessaries rather than expand it to 
cover married women.63  While the court noted that both itself and the Gen-
eral Assembly had the power to change the common law,64 it deemed the 
General Assembly the more appropriate form for determining if an expan-
                                                          
 55.  284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979). 
 56.  Id. at 341, 396 A.2d at 1073; see also Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 589–90, 414 A.2d 
929, 931 (1980) (noting that the common law may be changed by judicial decision or legislative 
act).  Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: “That the inhabitants of Maryland 
are entitled to the Common Law of England . . . subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and 
amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State.”  MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 5(a)(1). 
 57.  Pope, 284 Md. at 352, 396 A.2d at 1078. 
 58.  Id. at 334–36, 396 A.2d at 1069–70. 
 59.  Id. at 352, 396 A.2d at 1078. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 183, 438 A.2d 494, 499 (1981) (noting that a “declara-
tion of public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch” and that the court should 
not “alter a common law rule in the face of indications that to do so would be contrary to the pub-
lic policy of the state as set by the General Assembly”). 
 62.  289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981). 
 63.  Id. at 532, 425 A.2d at 1019.  The common law doctrine of necessities places a legal duty 
on the husband to supply his wife with “necessaries,” including medical care.  Id. at 520, 425 A.2d 
at 1013.  At common law, the wife had no similar duty to supply her husband with necessaries.  
Id. 
 64.  See id. at 530–31, 425 A.2d at 1018 (“Of course, the common law doctrine of necessaries 
is subject to change by constitutional or legislative enactment; it is also subject to change by judi-
cial decision where the Court finds, with or without regard to the ERA, that the common law rule 
is a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to the circumstances of our people.”). 
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sion of the common law doctrine was prudent.65  The court explained: 
“[W]hat best serves the societal need is, we think, a matter of such funda-
mental policy that it should be determined by the legislature.”66 
Shortly following Condore, the Court of Appeals further limited the 
power of the court to change the common law in Felder v. Butler.67  In 
Felder, the court was asked to change the common law to recognize a cause 
of action against sellers of alcohol for injuries “negligently caused by an in-
toxicated patron to an innocent third party.”68  While the court acknowl-
edged its power to change the common law, it noted that a “declaration of 
public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch and that the 
court should not “alter a common law rule in the face of indications that to 
do so would be contrary to the public policy of the State, as declared by the 
General Assembly.”69  Since the General Assembly had not yet imposed 
civil liability upon vendors of alcoholic beverages for the torts of their cus-
tomers, the court held that it should not either.70  The court reasoned that it 
was up to the General Assembly “to determine if the public policy of the 
State” would favor expanding tort liability to sellers of alcoholic beverag-
es.71 
Following Felder, the Court of Appeals continued to affirm that the 
common law should not be changed contrary to the intent of the General 
Assembly.72  Additionally, the court suggested, in Harrison v. Montgomery 
County Board of Education,73 that the failure of bills aimed at changing a 
common law doctrine indicated a legislative intent to maintain the status 
quo.74  In Harrison, the court was asked to abandon the common law doc-
trine of contributory negligence and adopt the doctrine of comparative neg-
ligence.75  The court acknowledged that it had the power to change or modi-
                                                          
 65.  Id. at 532, 425 A.2d at 1019. 
 66.  Id.; see also Adler v. American Standard, 291 Md. 31, 45, 432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981) 
(noting that a “declaration of public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch”). 
 67.  292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 494 (1981). 
 68.  Id. at 175, 438 A.2d at 495. 
 69.  Id. at 183, 438 A.2d at 499. 
 70.  Id. at 184, 438 A.2d at 499. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See Harrison v. Montgomery Cty Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 460, 456 A.2d 894, 903 
(1983) (noting that the Court of Appeals should not change the common law contrary to the intent 
of the General Assembly); see also Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 140–41, 497 A.2d 
1143, 1150–51 (1985) (noting that the common law is “subject to judicial modification” but also 
recognizing that “common law principles should not be changed contrary to the public policy of 
the State set forth by the General Assembly”); Ireland v. State, 310 Md. 328, 331, 529 A.2d 365, 
366 (1987) (noting that the court can change the common law but it should not be changed contra-
ry to the intent of the General Assembly). 
 73.  295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983). 
 74.  Id. at 462, 456 A.2d at 904. 
 75.  Id. at 444, 69 A.3d at 894.  Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, an injured 
plaintiff is completely barred from recovery in a negligence action when he or she fails to “act 
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fy a common law rule that “has become unsound in the circumstances of 
modern life, a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to our people.”76  How-
ever, the court questioned whether it should change the common law, not-
ing that “public policy is normally the function of the General Assembly” 
and that the General Assembly is “expressly empowered” to change the 
common law by Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.77  There-
fore, the court decided that it would be “particularly reluctant to alter a 
common law rule in the face of indications that to do so would be contrary 
to the public policy of the State,” as set by the General Assembly.78 
To determine the public policy of the state, the Harrison court looked 
to legislative history.  The court found that the General Assembly, from 
1966 to 1982, rejected “twenty-one bills seeking to replace the contributory 
negligence doctrine with a comparative fault system.”79  The court said, 
“Although not conclusive, the legislature’s action in rejecting the proposed 
change [was] indicative of an intention to retain the contributory negligence 
doctrine.”80  Additionally, the court thought that the adoption of compara-
tive negligence involved “fundamental and basic public policy considera-
tions” best left to the General Assembly.81  Given these observations, the 
court decided to leave any change in the established common law doctrine 
of contributory negligence to the legislature.82 
Following Harrison, the Court of Appeals continued to view the Gen-
eral Assembly’s failure to change common law principles as indicative of 
legislative intent to retain the status quo.83  For example, in Halliday v. 
Sturm,84 the court was asked to abandon the common law consumer expec-
tations test and adopt the risk utility test for products liability claims involv-
ing handguns.85  The court determined that the General Assembly’s rejec-
tion of multiple bills that would have abandoned the common law consumer 
expectations test and adopted a risk-utility test indicated a legislative intent 
not to subject gun manufacturers to the risk utility test.86  Although the 
common law was at issue, the court decided to “respect th[e] policy choice” 
                                                          
with the degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised for his own safe-
ty under the same or similar circumstances.”  Id. at 446, 69 A.3d at 895.  Under the doctrine of 
comparative negligence, losses are apportioned “on the basis of fault, with each party bearing the 
portion of the loss directly attributable to his conduct.”  Id. at 447, 69 A.3d at 896. 
 76.  Id. at 459, 69 A.3d at 903. 
 77.  Id. at 460, 69 A.3d at 903. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 462, 69 A.3d at 904. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. at 463, 69 A.3d at 905. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 368 Md. 186, 209, 297 A.2d 1145, 1159 (2002). 
 84.  368 Md. 186, 297 A.2d 1145 (2002). 
 85.  Id. at 192, 297 A.2d at 1149. 
 86.  Id. at 209, 297 A.2d at 1159.  
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of the General Assembly.87  Echoing the language of Harrison, the court 
reasoned that “common law principles should not be changed contrary to 
the public policy of the state set forth by the General Assembly of Mary-
land.”88 
In other situations, where the common law was not at issue, the Court 
of Appeals has similarly viewed legislative inaction as indicative of legisla-
tive intent.  For example, in Moore v. State,89 the Court of Appeals held that 
“the General Assembly’s repeated refusal to enact bills, which would have 
adopted a party’s particular view of the law, is strong evidence of legisla-
tive intent.”90  In Moore, the court analyzed whether Section 11-207(a)(5) 
of the Maryland criminal code prohibits a defendant from using a computer 
to communicate with a person, whom the defendant believes to be a minor, 
for purposes of engaging in sexual conduct, but who is actually an adult un-
dercover police officer.91  The court held that Section 11-207(a)(5) did not 
as there had been six prior unsuccessful attempts in the General Assembly 
to amend Section 11-207 to “prohibit computer communications with 
‘someone believed to be a minor’ for the purpose of engaging in sexual 
conduct.”92  The court noted that “legislative inaction is very significant 
where bills have repeatedly been introduced in the General Assembly to ac-
complish a particular result, and where the General Assembly has persis-
tently refused to enact such bills.”93 
C.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia 
In the 2013 decision, Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia,94 the 
Court of Appeals refused to change a common law doctrine based on the 
“General Assembly’s repeated refusal to do so.”95  Coleman, echoing the 
reasoning from Harrison, tied two major premises together.96  First, relying 
on Felder, the court determined that it should not change the common law 
contrary to the intent of the General Assembly.97  Second, relying on 
Moore, the court determined that legislative inaction is indicative of legisla-
                                                          
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. at 208, 297 A.2d at 1158–59 (quoting Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 141, 
249 A.2d 1143, 1151 (1985)). 
 89.  388 Md. 623, 882 A.2d 256 (2005). 
 90.  Id. at 641, 882 A.2d at 267.  Note that Moore involved the interpretation of a statute, not 
the merits of a common law doctrine. 
 91.  Id. at 624–26, 882 A.2d at 257 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-207(a)(5)). 
 92.  Id. at 635–36, 641–42, 882 A.2d at 264, 267. 
 93.  Id. at 641, 882 A.2d at 267. 
 94.  432 Md. 679, 69 A.3d 1149 (2013). 
 95.  Id. at 695, 69 A.3d at 1158. 
 96.  See id. at 694–95, 69 A.3d at 1158 (holding that repeated legislative inaction is indicative 
of legislative intent and that the court should not change the common law contrary to the intent of 
the General Assembly). 
 97.  Id.  
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tive intent when multiple bills have been introduced to accomplish a partic-
ular result and the General Assembly has rejected those bills.98 
In Coleman, the Court of Appeals was asked, as it was in Harrison, to 
abrogate the common law doctrine of contributory negligence and replace it 
with the doctrine of comparative negligence.99  The court noted that since 
Harrison, the General Assembly had rejected multiple bills that would have 
abandoned the doctrine of contributory negligence and replaced it with the 
doctrine of comparative negligence.100  The Coleman court, citing Moore, 
reasoned that the General Assembly’s “repeated failure to pass legislation 
abrogating the defense of contributory negligence is very strong evidence 
that the legislative policy in Maryland is to retain the principle of contribu-
tory negligence.”101  Since the court held in Felder that the common law 
should not be changed contrary to the intent of the General Assembly, the 
court decided that abrogating the doctrine of contributory negligence, “in 
the face of the General Assembly’s repeated refusal to do so, would be to-
tally inconsistent with the court’s long-standing jurisprudence.”102 
D.  Cases in Contention with Coleman 
Before moving on to an analysis of Coleman, it is important to point 
out that Coleman is inconsistent with a number of Maryland cases which 
were neither expressly overturned, mentioned, or even distinguished in 
Coleman.  First, there are a number of cases in which the Court of Appeals 
decided to change the common law despite legislative inaction.103  Addi-
tionally, Maryland’s jurisprudence is full of cases in which the Court of 
Appeals has viewed legislative inaction as a weak indicator of legislative 
intent.104  The majority in Coleman either outright ignored many of these 
cases or failed to distinguish them in its decision.105 
1.  Cases in Which the Court of Appeals Decided to Change the 
Common Law When the General Assembly Failed to Do So 
Despite the Court of Appeals reluctance in Coleman to change the 
common law contrary to the supposed intent of the General Assembly, in 
other cases the court altered or abandoned unjust and outdated common law 
                                                          
 98.  Id. at 693, 69 A.3d at 1157 (citing Moore, 388 Md. at 641, 882 A.2d at 267). 
 99.  Id. at 682, 69 A.3d 1150. 
 100.  Id. at 694, 69 A.3d at 1158. 
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Id. at 695, 69 A.3d at 1158. 
 103.  See infra Section I.D.1.  
 104.  See infra Section I.D.2.  
 105.  See generally Coleman, 432 Md. 679, 69 A.3d 1149 (2013). 
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rules when the General Assembly failed to act.106  In these “outlying” cases, 
the court firmly asserted its authority to change the common law and de-
termined that it is “eminently wise” of the court to change a common law 
rule that is a “vestige of the past.”107 
In Lusby v. Lusby,108 the Court of Appeals changed the common law 
interspousal immunity rule despite the General Assembly’s refusal to do 
so.109  In Lusby, the court was asked to change the common law rule that a 
“married woman cannot maintain an action against her husband for injuries 
caused by his negligent or tortious act.”110  Prior to Lusby, the court de-
clined to change the interspousal tort immunity rule in Stokes v. Ass’n of 
Independent Taxi Operators,111 determining that “if the rule is to be 
changed, the Legislature will have to do it.”112  In Lusby, however, the court 
noted that in the ten years since the Stokes decision the General Assembly 
had not “heeded” the court’s suggestions that the General Assembly change 
the rule.113  The court found a multitude of reasons to abandon the rule: 
many other jurisdictions had altered the rule,114 legal commentators nearly 
unanimously criticized the rule,115 and there was “no sound public policy” 
for preventing one spouse from suing another for outrageous conduct.116  
Therefore, despite the General Assembly’s refusal to change the rule, the 
court changed the common law doctrine of spousal immunity to allow a 
wife to sue her husband for damages resulting from an “outrageous, inten-
tional tort.”117 
After Lusby, the Court of Appeals continued to make changes to the 
common law doctrine of interspousal immunity.118  In Boblitz v. Boblitz,119 
the court abrogated the interspousal immunity rule in negligence cases.120  
The court acknowledged that “for reasons of certainty and stability, changes 
                                                          
 106.  Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 
242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978). 
 107.  Bozman, 376 Md. at 495, 830 A.2d at 470. 
 108.  283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978). 
 109.  Id. at 357–58, 390 A.2d at 88–89. 
 110.  Id. at 337, 390 A.2d at 78 (quoting David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 534, 157 A. 755, 756 
(1932)). 
 111.  248 Md. 690, 237 A.2d 762 (1968). 
 112.  Id. at 692, 237 A.2d at 763.  
 113.  Lusby, 283 Md. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88. 
 114.  Id. at 346–48, 390 A.2d at 83–84. 
 115.  Id. at 350, 390 A.2d at 84. 
 116.  Id. at 357, 390 A.2d at 88. 
 117.  Id. at 335, 390 A.2d at 77. 
 118.  See, e.g., Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 275, 462 A.2d 506, 522 (1983) (abandoning 
“the interspousal immunity rule in this State as to cases sounding in negligence”). 
 119.  296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983). 
 120.  Id. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522. 
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in decisional doctrine ordinarily should be left to the Legislature.”121  The 
court noted, however, that it has the power to change or modify a common 
law rule by judicial decision when it finds “in light of changed conditions or 
increased knowledge that the rule has become unsound in the circumstances 
of modern life, a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to our people.”122  
The court determined that, since the legislature had not spoken on the topic 
of interspousal immunity, there was not a “legislative barrier to abrogation 
of this outmoded rule of law.”123  Therefore, the court abrogated the doc-
trine of interspousal immunity in negligence cases, determining that the rule 
was “unsound in the circumstances of modern life.”124 
In Bozman v. Bozman,125 the court ultimately abandoned the doctrine 
of interspousal immunity despite continued legislative inaction.126  The 
court noted that stare decisis is not an “inexorable command,” requiring 
unwavering deference to the legislature.127  The court found that it is “emi-
nently wise” of the court to abrogate a common law doctrine that is “a ves-
tige of the past.”128  Therefore, the court, noting that many other states had 
already abandoned the rule, completely discarded the interspousal immunity 
rule.129 
2.  Cases in Which the Court of Appeals Viewed Legislative 
Inaction as a Weak Indicator of Legislative Intent 
While the Court of Appeals found in Coleman that legislative inaction 
is indicative of legislative intent, in a number of other cases the court held 
                                                          
 121.  Id. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521. 
 122.  Id. at 274, 462 A.2d at 521–22 (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 295 
Md. 442, 460, 456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983). 
 123.  Boblitz, 296 Md. at 274, 462 A.2d at 522.  The court noted that deference to the legisla-
ture may be warranted in cases, such as Harrison, where the legislature “repeatedly had rejected 
efforts to achieve legislatively that which [the court] [was] asked to grant judicially.”  Id. at 274, 
462 A.2d at 521.  While the majority found that there was no such legislative barrier to changing 
the doctrine of interspousal immunity in Boblitz, this finding is factually incorrect.  Judge Couch, 
in his dissent, noted that the legislature had in fact considered the doctrine of interspousal immuni-
ty “seven times without enacting any legislation” since 1959.  Id. at 287, 462 A.2d at 527 (Couch, 
J., dissenting).  Thus, Boblitz was actually quite similar to Harrison because both involved a po-
tential change to a common law doctrine that had been repeatedly rejected by the General Assem-
bly. 
 124.  Id. at 274, 462 A.2d at 522. 
 125.  376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003). 
 126.  Id. at 462, 830 A.2d at 451. 
 127.  Id. at 493, 830 A.2d at 469 (first quoting Perry v. State, 357 Md. 37, 96–100, 741 A.2d 
1162, 1194–95 (1999); then quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 854 (1992)). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 496–97, 830 A.2d at 471. 
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that legislative inaction is a poor indicator of legislative intent.130  In these 
cases, the court was reluctant to draw inferences about legislative intent 
from legislative inaction “because more than one purpose can be attributed 
to the defeat of legislation.”131 
In the 1973 decision Hearst Corp. v. State Department of Assessments 
& Taxation,132 the Court of Appeals was unimpressed by arguments that the 
General Assembly’s failure to act after a court decision constituted “legisla-
tive acquiescence” to that decision because there were “alternative rational-
izations” for the legislature’s failure to act that were “equally palatable.”133  
The Hearst court buttressed its decision by quoting the Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Price:134 “Such nonaction by Congress [failure 
to act after an adverse court decision] affords the most dubious foundation 
for drawing positive inferences.”135 
A few years later in Harden v. Mass Transit Administration,136  the 
Court of Appeals was equally unimpressed by an argument that the General 
Assembly’s failure to pass bills which would have excluded the Mass 
Transit Administration (“MTA”) from the coverage of “no fault” statutes 
indicated a legislative intent to require that MTA  maintain “no fault” insur-
ance for passengers.137  The court noted that the failure of the bills was a 
“weak reed” upon which to draw positive inferences.138  The court reasoned 
“[i]t could equally be argued that the General Assembly thought it perfectly 
plain that MTA was not included within the framework of the statute and, 
therefore, no amendment was necessary.”139  Following Harden, the court, 
in both Automobile Trade Ass’n v. Insurance Commissioner and Police 
Commissioner v. Dowling,  found the failure of a bill’s passage is a poor in-
dication for understanding legislative intent.140 
                                                          
 130.  Goldstein v. State, 339 Md. 563, 664 A.2d 375 (1995); Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 
277 Md. 399, 354 A.2d 817 (1976); Hearst Corp. v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation, 269 
Md. 625, 308 A.2d 679 (1973). 
 131.  Goldstein, 339 Md. at 570, 664 A.2d at 378. 
 132.  269 Md. 625, 308 A.2d 679 (1973). 
 133.  Id. at 644−45, 308 A.2d at 689. 
 134.  361 U.S. 304 (1960). 
 135.  Hearst Corp., 269 Md. at 644, 308 A.2d at 689 (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 311–12 (1960)). 
 136.  277 Md. 399, 354 A.2d 817 (1976). 
 137.  Id. at 401, 406, 354 A.2d at 818, 820–21. 
 138.  Id. at 406, 354 A.2d at 820–21. 
 139.  Id. at 406, 354 A.2d at 821. 
 140.  Auto. Trade Ass’n v. Ins. Comm’r, 292 Md. 15, 24, 437 A.2d 199, 203 (1981); Police 
Comm’r v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 420–21, 379 A.2d 1007, 1012 (1977) (noting that a party’s 
attempt to draw a favorable inference from the failure of a bill is a weak argument because that 
bill could have failed for a variety of reasons). 
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In Goldstein v. State,141 the Court of Appeals continued to view the 
failure of bills as a “weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining legisla-
tive intent.”142  The court further stated: “[T]he mere fact that the General 
Assembly has declined to adopt a particular proposal does not preclude this 
Court from incorporating the substance of that proposal into the common 
law.”143  In Goldstein, the petitioner argued that the rejection of multiple 
bills that would authorize the use of “laser speed determinations as evidence 
in legal proceedings” was evidence that the General Assembly concluded 
that such measures “are not sufficiently reliable to be admissible” in 
court.144  The court noted that legislative inaction in this case was ambigu-
ous because “more than one purpose can be attributed to the defeat of the 
legislation.”145 
Despite the cases mentioned above, contributory negligence remains 
the law of Maryland because, as explained in Coleman, (1) the Court of 
Appeals believes it should not change the common law contrary to legisla-
tive intent and (2) the Court of Appeals views the failure of the legislature 
to change the common law as a strong indicator of legislative intent to 
maintain the current state of the law.146 
II.  ANALYSIS 
In Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, the Court of Appeals held 
that it should not change the common law doctrine of contributory negli-
gence in the face of the General Assembly’s repeated refusal to do so.147  
The court erred for two reasons.  First, as examined in Section A, the Gen-
eral Assembly’s repeated failure to change a common law doctrine is not 
strong evidence of a legislative intent to maintain the status quo.148  Second, 
as discussed in Section B, the court should not defer to the legislature when 
it is considering a change to a judicially created common law doctrine.149  
Instead, the court should take action and change a common law doctrine 
when it finds that the doctrine is “unsound in the circumstances of modern 
life,” as argued in Section C.150  Finally, the Court of Appeals should aban-
                                                          
 141.  339 Md. 563, 664 A.2d 375 (1995). 
 142.  Id. at 569–70, 664 A.2d at 378 (quoting Auto. Trade Ass’n, 292 Md. at 24, 437 A.2d at 
203). 
 143.  Id.  
 144.  Id. at 568–69, 664 A.2d at 377. 
 145.  Id. at 570, 664 A.2d at 378. 
 146.  Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n, 432 Md. 679, 694–95, 69 A.3d 1149, 1158 (2013). 
 147.  See id. at 715, 69 A.3d at 1170 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (“This Court Need Not Defer to 
Continued Legislative Inaction”). 
 148.  See infra Section II.A. 
 149.  See infra Section II.B. 
 150.  Harrison v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 459, 456 A.2d 894, 903 
(1983); see infra Section II.C. 
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don the common law doctrine of contributory negligence, as discussed in 
Section D.151 
A.  The General Assembly’s Repeated Failure to Change a Common 
Law Doctrine Is Not Strong Evidence of a Legislative Intent to 
Maintain the Status Quo 
In Coleman, the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the 
General Assembly’s refusal to change an uncodified common law doctrine 
was strong evidence of a legislative intent to retain that doctrine.152  Such a 
conclusion ignores the realities of the legislative process.153  It is often dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to determine the exact reason for the failure of a 
bill.154  Additionally, the failure of bills often represent flaws inherent in the 
legislative process rather than public policy.155 
1.  It Is Nearly Impossible to Draw Accurate Conclusions from the 
Failure of One or Even Many Bills 
Some judges argue that while legislative inaction does not always pro-
vide “crystalline revelation,” it can be “probative to varying degrees.”156  
For example, on the surface it may seem logical for the Court of Appeals to 
assume that the General Assembly intended to retain the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence, given that multiple bills, which would have abandoned 
contributory negligence and adopted comparative negligence, failed in the 
General Assembly.  However, drawing such a conclusion about legislative 
intent from the failure of these bills ignores other potential conclusions that 
can be logically drawn from the failure of legislation.157  For example, Jus-
tice Scalia argued:  
[I]t [is] impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that 
congressional failure to act represents (1) approval of the status 
quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the sta-
tus quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the 
status quo, or even (5) political cowardice.158 
Applying Justice Scalia’s framework to the repeated failure of com-
parative negligence bills in the General Assembly demonstrates that the 
                                                          
 151.  See infra Section II.D. 
 152.  See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671–72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[O]ne must ignore rudimentary principles of political science to draw any conclusions regarding 
[legislative] intent from the failure to enact legislation.”). 
 153.  See id. 
 154.  See infra Section II.A.1. 
 155.  See infra Section II.A.2. 
 156.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 629 n.7.  
 157.  Id. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 158.  Id. 
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Coleman court erred when it held that the failure of these bills represented 
the General Assembly’s approval of the doctrine of contributory negligence.  
It is possible that the failure of these bills represented approval of the doc-
trine of contributory negligence, but it could also represent a number of 
other things.  First, the General Assembly’s failure to act could represent 
disagreement about how to change the doctrine of contributory negligence.  
For example, the bills cited by the court in Coleman could have failed be-
cause the General Assembly could not agree on whether pure comparative 
fault or modified comparative fault was the better doctrine to adopt.159  Ad-
ditionally, the General Assembly may have been unable to agree on how to 
change other negligence doctrines, such as the doctrine of joint and several 
liability, which would be affected by the adoption of comparative negli-
gence.160  Second, legislators could have concluded that changing a judi-
cially created common law doctrine was a job better suited for the Court of 
Appeals than the General Assembly.161  For example, in the mid 1990’s, 
some Maryland legislators who voted against replacing comparative negli-
gence with comparative fault explained their vote by asserting that such a 
change was a “matter for the courts to decide.”162  Third, the failure of the 
bills could have represented indifference on the part of the General Assem-
bly.163  In some of the legislative sessions in which these comparative neg-
ligence bills were introduced, the General Assembly could have simply had 
more pressing issues to address and let comparative bills die in committee 
in order to reserve time to address other issues.  Finally, many of the bills 
could have failed simply due to political cowardice.164  Legislators could 
have voted down bills due to fear of political reprisals from powerful Mary-
land lobby groups that favor retaining the doctrine of contributory negli-
                                                          
 159.  See DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., supra note 2, at 17 (describing the various negligence sys-
tems in the fifty states and D.C.).  “Under a pure comparative fault system, each party is held re-
sponsible for damages in proportion to the party’s fault.  Regardless of the level of the plaintiff’s 
own negligence, the plaintiff can still recover something from a negligent defendant.”  Id. at 4.  In 
contrast, “[u]nder a modified comparative fault system, each party is held responsible for damages 
in proportion to his or her own fault, unless the plaintiff’s negligence reaches a certain designated 
percentage of fault.”  Id. at 5. 
 160.  See id. at 18–21 (examining how other negligence doctrines are affected by the adoption 
of comparative negligence). 
 161.  See Donald G. Gifford & Christopher J. Robinette, Apportioning Liability in Maryland 
Tort Cases: Time to End Contributory Negligence and Joint and Several Liability, 73 MD. L. REV. 
701, 702 (2014) (“During the mid-1990s, one of us (Gifford) attended committee hearings of the 
Maryland General Assembly considering replacing contributory negligence with comparative 
fault.  Legislators who voted against such reform legislation often explained their votes by saying 
‘this is a matter for the courts to decide.’”).  
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Johnson, 480 U.S. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 164.  See id. (identifying “political cowardice” as a reason why bills fail). 
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gence.165  Admittedly, these conclusions are speculative, but no less specu-
lative than the court’s conclusion in Coleman.  In Coleman, the Court of 
Appeals ultimately drew a single inference about the failure of multiple 
bills without considering any other potential explanations.166 
Moreover, the Coleman court’s conclusion that the General Assem-
bly’s refusal to change a common law rule is strong evidence of a legisla-
tive intent to retain the rule ignores the fact that the General Assembly can 
codify a common law rule by statute.  If the General Assembly truly wanted 
to retain the doctrine of contributory negligence, it should have passed a bill 
codifying the doctrine.  The General Assembly actually rejected multiple 
efforts to codify the doctrine of contributory negligence.167  As pointed out 
by Professors Donald Gifford and Christopher Robinette, “the [Coleman] 
court’s failure to even mention this legislative inaction is totally at odds 
with its conclusion that legislative inaction establishes the public policy of 
the state.  The court cannot have it both ways.”168 
Given the multitude of potential reasons for legislative inaction, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, for the court to draw a single conclusion from 
the failure of one or even many bills.169  The court may have a stronger ar-
gument for drawing a conclusion from legislative inaction when there is 
clear evidence of precisely why a bill failed.  In Coleman, however, the 
court makes a highly speculative conclusion without considering other pos-
sibilities.170 
Despite the Court of Appeals’s holding in Coleman, the court has rec-
ognized on other occasions that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a 
single conclusion from legislative inaction.171  For example, in Goldstein, 
the Court of Appeals found that legislative inaction is often ambiguous be-
cause “more than one purpose can be attributed to the defeat of legisla-
tion.”172  Similarly, in Hearst Corp. v. State Department of Assessments & 
Taxation the court held that drawing one conclusion from legislative inac-
tion is flawed when there are “alternative rationalizations” for legislation 
                                                          
 165.  See Gifford & Robinette, supra note 161, at 702 (acknowledging the power of business 
and insurance lobbyists who oppose the adoption of comparative negligence). 
 166.  See Coleman v. Soccer Ass’n, 432 Md. 679, 694–95, 69 A.3d 1149, 1158 (2013) (con-
cluding that the “General Assembly’s repeated failure to pass legislation abrogating the defense of 
contributory negligence is very strong evidence that the legislative policy in Maryland is to retain 
the principle of contributory negligence”). 
 167.  See id. at 719 (noting the General Assembly’s failure to codify the doctrine of contributo-
ry negligence); see also DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., supra note 2, at 41 (describing the failure of 
bills in 2011 and 2012 which would have codified the doctrine of contributory negligence). 
 168.  See Gifford & Robinette, supra note 161, at 719. 
 169.  See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 671–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 170.  See generally Coleman, 432 Md. at 694–95, 69 A.3d at1158. 
 171.  See Gifford & Robinette, supra note 161, at 717 (“The legislature’s failure to act, howev-
er, does not necessarily indicate its opposition to a proposed piece of legislation.”). 
 172.  Goldstein v. State, 339 Md. 563, 570, 664 A.2d 375, 378 (1995). 
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inaction that are “equally palatable.”173  The Supreme Court has similarly 
acknowledged that “nonaction by Congress affords the most dubious foun-
dation for drawing positive inferences.”174  Each of these decisions reflects 
an understanding that it often is difficult or impossible to determine why a 
bill or even multiple bills failed, as each decision recognizes that there are 
often alternate reason for not passing desirable legislation. 
2.  The Failure of Bills Often Represents Inherent Flaws in the 
Legislative Process Rather than Public Policy 
The Court of Appeals in Coleman inferred public policy from legisla-
tive inaction when it concluded that the General Assembly’s repeated fail-
ure to pass comparative negligence bills was strong evidence of a public 
policy in Maryland to retain the doctrine of contributory negligence.175  
However, inferring public policy from legislative inaction ignores the flaws 
inherent in the legislative process.176  First, the structure of the legislative 
process makes it “far more likely that something will not happen (inaction) 
than that it will (action).”177  Even if a majority of the members of a legisla-
ture favor a piece of legislation, the bill can be killed by a hostile committee 
or hostile party leadership.178  Second, inferring public policy from legisla-
tive inaction is flawed because the legislative process favors small, wealthy, 
well-defined, and well-organized groups rather than the desires of the “dis-
organized general public.”179  Legislators often face immense pressure from 
these small, well-organized groups while facing very little from the unor-
ganized general public.180  Therefore, legislative inaction often represents 
the influence of well-organized lobby groups who are able to use their in-
fluence to kill legislation in an environment that already favors inaction.181 
The history of comparative negligence legislation in Maryland pro-
vides a good illustration of how the failure of legislation often represents 
the flaws inherent in the legislative process, particular the ability of a small 
committee to kill a bill, rather than public policy.182  Between 1966 and 
                                                          
 173.  Hearst Corp. v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation, 269 Md. 625, 644, 308 A.2d 
679, 689 (1973). 
 174.  United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310–11 (1960). 
 175.  Coleman, 432 Md. at 694–95, 69 A.3d at 1158. 
 176.  See Gifford & Robinette, supra note 161, at 718 (“It is far easier to kill a legislative pro-
posal than it is to enact it.”). 
 177.  William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 98 
(1988).  
 178.  Id. at 99. 
 179.  See id. at 105. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  See id. at 105 (“[E]ven when the legislature does respond, its pattern of response is biased 
in favor of well-organized (and frequently wholly unrepresentative) groups.”). 
 182.  4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES & GRAY ON TORTS § 22.18 at 495 (3d ed. 
2006). 
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1982, twenty-one bills proposing the adoption of comparative negligence 
were introduced in the General Assembly.183  Nineteen died in the House 
Judiciary Committee.184  The only two bills that emerged from the House 
Judiciary Committee passed the House of Delegates by overwhelming mar-
gins, one passed by a vote of 114 to 8 and the other passed by a vote of 105 
to 12.185  Both these bills were later killed by the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee.186  In Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education, the Court 
of Appeals refused to abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence, con-
cluding that the failure of these twenty bills was “indicative of an intention 
to retain the contributory negligence doctrine.”187  Yet, as noted above, the 
legislative history suggests that the majority of the members of the General 
Assembly actually favored the change.188  In the year after Harrison was 
decided, the Maryland Senate passed a comparative negligence bill by a 
margin of 45 to 1.189  This bill was defeated, however, in the House Judici-
ary Committee.190  Some scholars have gone as far to argue the failure of 
these bills was more indicative of the “superior ability of insurers’ lobbyists 
to influence a committee or its chairman,” than public policy.191  At the 
very least though, the failure of comparative negligence bills from 1966 
to1984 was less indicative of a  public policy favoring contributory negli-
gence and more indicative of the flaws inherent in the legislative process, 
particularly the ability of a small committee to kill a piece of legislation.192 
For the above reasons, the Court of Appeals should not draw infer-
ences about legislative intent and public policy from the General Assem-
bly’s repeated failure to change an uncodified common law doctrine.  It is 
nearly impossible to draw accurate conclusions from the failure of one or 
even many bills.193  Additionally, the failure of legislation often represents 
flaws in the legislative process, not public policy.194 
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B.  The Court of Appeals Should Not Defer to the Legislature When It 
Is Considering a Change to an Uncodified, Judicially Created 
Common Law Doctrine 
In Coleman, the Court of Appeals did not contest that it had the power 
change the common law.  Indeed, the court stated that the “principle of stare 
decisis should not be construed to ‘inhibit [this Court] from changing or 
modifying a common law rule by judicial decision where we find, in light 
of changed conditions or increased knowledge, that the rule has become un-
sound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the past, no longer 
suitable to our people.”195  The court held, however, that it should not 
change the common law contrary to the intent of the General Assembly be-
cause a “declaration of the public policy of Maryland is normally the func-
tion of the General Assembly; that body, by Article 5 of the Maryland Dec-
laration of Rights is expressly empowered to revise the common law of 
Maryland by legislative enactment.”196 
The Court of Appeals should not defer to the legislature when it is pre-
sented with the opportunity to make a change to an outdated common law 
rule.197  When the court refuses to take action and change an outdated 
common law rule, it perpetuates injustices that it has the power to correct, 
undermining public confidence in the courts and creating a mutual state of 
inaction with the legislature.198  Additionally, the Court of Appeals shirks 
its duty as a common law court when it refuses to change an unjust com-
mon law doctrine.199  Furthermore, the Court of Appeals is an appropriate 
forum for changing the common law.200 
1.  When the Court Refuses to Change the Common Law, It 
Perpetuates Injustices It Has the Power to Correct 
When a court is asked to overrule a prior decision, “consideration must 
be given to the doctrine of stare decisis—the policy which entails the reaf-
firmation of a decisional doctrine of an appellate court, even though if con-
sidered for the first time, the Court might reach a different conclusion.”201  
Courts like stare decisis because it ensures stable and certain application of 
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legal principles.202  Admittedly, public confidence in the courts largely de-
pends on “uniformity and consistency” in the way the law is interpreted and 
applied.203  Those who favor strict adherence to stare decisis see the legisla-
ture as the more appropriate branch for changing unjust or outdated laws 
because the legislature is commonly seen as the body from which public 
policy emanates.204 As the Court of Appeals stated in Harrison: “[F]or rea-
sons of certainty and stability, changes in decisional doctrine are left to the 
Legislature.”205 
When it comes to common law doctrines, however, deference to the 
legislature and mechanical adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis perpet-
uates injustices that the court should correct.  After all, what good is the 
consistent and uniform application of unjust and outdated rules?  Other 
courts across the country have recognized this problem and noted the neces-
sity for judicial action regarding unjust, judge-created, common law doc-
trines.  For example, in Alvis v. Ribar,206 the Supreme Court of Illinois 
abandoned the doctrine of contributory negligence, finding that “the need 
for stability in law must not be allowed to obscure the changing needs of 
society or to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevalua-
tion.”207  Similarly, in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach,208 the Florida 
Supreme Court abandoned a common law rule which immunized municipal 
corporations against liability by torts committed by police officers, stating, 
“[T]he courts should be alive to the demands of justice.”209 
Furthermore, when the Court of Appeals refuses to correct injustices 
created by outdated common law doctrines, it undermines public confidence 
in the courts.  In McIntyre v. Balentine,210 the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
abandoned the doctrine of contributory negligence, noting that “mindless 
obedience to stare decisis can confound the search for truth and foster an 
attitude of contempt” towards the courts.211  The Balentine court affirmed 
its commitment to justice over consistency and stability, stating, “Justice 
simply will not permit our continued adherence to a [contributory negli-
gence] rule that, in the face of a judicial determination that other bear pri-
mary responsibility, nevertheless completely denies injured litigants recom-
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pense for their damages.”212  Similarly, in Hanover v. Ruch,213 the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee recognized, “As a living and breathing thing, the [Court 
should change the law] when necessary to serve the needs of the people. 
When this basic purpose of the law is slighted or overlooked, then it loses a 
high degree of its majesty.”214 
The facts of Coleman illustrate the injustice that results from the Court 
of Appeal’s refusal to change an outdated common law doctrine.  In 2008, 
James Coleman, a twenty-year-old volunteer coach, kicked a soccer ball in-
to a soccer goal during a youth soccer practice in Howard County, Mary-
land.215  As Coleman passed under the goal’s crossbar, “he jumped up and 
grabbed the crossbar,” an act soccer players “commonly” engage in.216  
Tragically, “the goal was not anchored to the ground,” causing Coleman to 
fall “backwards,” pulling the goal with him and “drawing the weight of the 
crossbar onto his face.”217  As a result, Coleman “suffered multiple severe 
facial fractures which required surgery and the placing of three titanium 
plates in his face.”218  Coleman filed a lawsuit against the Soccer Associa-
tion of Columbia and a Howard County jury found the soccer club’s negli-
gence in failing to anchor the goal properly caused Coleman’s injuries.219  
The jury, however, also found that Coleman acted negligently in hanging 
from the crossbar.220  Because of this contributory negligence finding, 
Coleman was barred from any recovery and had to bear the full costs of his 
accident.221  In the ensuing appeal, the Court of Appeals ultimately refused 
to abandon contributory negligence in favor of comparative fault, allowing 
the soccer club to escape liability.222  In Coleman, the Court had the power 
to, and could have adopted comparative negligence, forcing the soccer club 
to pay its fair share of Coleman’s damages.  Instead, the court’s adherence 
to stare decisis forced Coleman to bear the full costs of the accident. 
Despite the Court of Appeals’s refusal to abrogate the common law 
doctrine of contributory negligence in Coleman, it has recognized in other 
cases that strict adherence to stare decisis and continued deference to the 
legislature perpetuates injustices that the court should correct.  For example, 
in Bozman v. Bozman,223 the Court of Appeals acknowledged that: 
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Strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis would severely 
limit a court’s ability to decide disputes, even in cases where the 
applicable guiding law had been decided incorrectly, or, in times 
of change social circumstance.  Under such a strict application of 
stare decisis, the United States Supreme Court would have to 
have deferred to Congressional action because it would have been 
powerless to end segregation in public education [as it did in 
Brown v. Board of Education224], with the result that the judicial-
ly created doctrine of “separate but equal,” [laid down in Plessy v. 
Ferguson225] would have continued to be the law.226 
To be fair, the court in Coleman did not dispute the courts ability to 
change the common law, it only suggested that it should let the legislature 
do it instead.227  However, deference to the legislature leads to the same re-
sult, the law does not change.  In the example mentioned above, if the Court 
in Brown had reaffirmed Plessy and deferred to Congress on the issue of 
segregation, the country would have likely waited longer for congress to 
end “separate but equal.”228 
Finally, the Court of Appeals refusal to change the common law essen-
tially creates a staring contest where the “court awaits action by the legisla-
ture and the legislature awaits guidance from the court.”229  This mutual 
state of inaction may be why Maryland has not yet abandoned the doctrine 
of contributory negligence.230  When a mutual state of inaction exists and 
causes an outdated and unjust common law doctrine to remain unchanged, 
the court should act.  As the Illinois Supreme Court pointed out in Alvis, 
when the legislature has “failed to act to remedy a gap in the common law 
that results in injustice, it is the imperative duty of the court to repair that 
injustice and reform the law to be responsive to the demands of society.”231 
2.  In Coleman, the Court Ignored Its Obligations as a Common 
Law Court 
By refusing to change outdated and unjust common law doctrines, the 
Court of Appeals ignores the obligations of a common law court.232  The 
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common law is judge-created and it is primarily the duty of the courts, not 
the legislature, to change the common law when the “circumstances warrant 
modification.”233  In his article, The Death of the Common Law, Professor 
Donald Gifford points out, “A common law court cannot pass the buck.  In-
deed, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has repeatedly stated that ‘it is our 
duty to determine the common law as it exists in this State.’”234  In fulfilling 
this duty, the court must look to past precedents, but it should not mechani-
cally adhere to those precedents.235  Professor Gifford argues that the com-
mon law must evolve with “societal norms” and unjust precedents should 
be critically evaluated.236  Professor Gifford quotes Justice Harlan Stone: 
“[T]he law itself is something better than its bad precedents . . . the bad 
precedent must on occasion yield to the better reason.”237 
Contemporary academics are not the only ones who believe that it is 
primarily the duty of the court to change the common law.  Maryland’s 
founders also understood that it was primarily the duty of the judiciary to 
determine whether common law principles should be incorporated into the 
law of Maryland or abandoned.  Jeremiah Chase, the Chief Judge of the 
Maryland Court of Appeals from 1806 to 1826, a drafter of the Maryland 
Constitution of 1776, a member of the Continental Congress, a drafter of 
the Northwest Ordinance, and delegate to the state convention of 1788 to 
ratify the Federal Constitution, stated simply, “Whether particular parts of 
the common law are applicable to our local circumstances and situation, and 
our general code of laws and jurisprudence is a question that comes within 
the province of the courts of justice and is to be decided by them.”238  Chief 
Judge Chase also noted that the judiciary had the power to decide what 
parts of the common law have become “obsolete from non-user or other 
cause.”239  Chief Judge Chase, a drafter of Maryland’s Constitution, under-
stood that while the state legislature holds concurrent power to change the 
common law, the judiciary has the primary duty to answer common law 
questions and determine which common law principles are applicable to 
“local circumstances” and which are not.240  Chief Judge Chase’s opinion 
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reflects an understanding that the express provision in the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights which gives the General Assembly to change the common 
law does not diminish the Court of Appeals’s power to change the common 
law.241 
Courts in other jurisdictions have also recognized that it is primarily 
the duty of the judiciary to change the common law.  In Hargrove, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court pointed out the absurdity of a court refusing to change a 
doctrine that it adopted or created, stating “[w]e can see no necessity for in-
sisting on legislative action in a matter which the courts themselves origi-
nated.”242  The Florida Supreme Court further emphasized this point in 
Gates v. Foley,243 clarifying that “[l]egislative action could, of course, be 
taken, but we abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly non-statutory, 
when we refuse to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule.”244  
The Maryland Court of Appeals, prior to Coleman, recognized that the ac-
tions of the legislature do not affect the ability of the court to change the 
common law.  In Goldstein, the court stated “the mere fact that the General 
Assembly has declined to adopt a particular proposal does not preclude this 
Court from incorporating the substance of that proposal into the common 
law.”245 
3.  The Court Is an Appropriate Forum for Changing the Common 
Law 
In Coleman, the Court of Appeals reasoned that changing an outdated 
common law doctrine, although created by the judiciary, often involves the 
kind of policy considerations best left to the legislature.246  In both Harrison 
and Coleman, the court determined that abandoning the common law doc-
trine of contributory negligence and adopting a form of comparative negli-
gence was a “decision [that] would encompass a variety of choices to be 
made.”247  Not only would a change to comparative negligence have major 
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changes “on other fundamental areas of negligence law,”248 such as the last 
clear chance doctrine and the doctrine of joint and several liability,249 the 
court would also have to choose between pure comparative negligence or a 
form modified comparative negligence.250  Both the Harrison and Coleman 
courts concluded that such a decision “‘involves major policy considera-
tions’ of the sort best left to the General Assembly.”251 
The Harrison and Coleman courts ignored the fact that the courts are 
well equipped to deal with the kinds of policy issues implicated by a change 
to a common law doctrine.252  The kinds of policy decisions implicated by a 
change in a common law doctrine involve arguments about fairness and jus-
tice that “are characteristically the kinds of arguments that courts consider 
in fashioning legal doctrine.”253  In addition, other state courts that aban-
doned contributory negligence were able to resolve most of the collateral 
issues associated with a switch to comparative negligence.  For example, 
the Tennessee Supreme Court, in McIntyre, solved most of the collateral is-
sues associated with a change from contributory to comparative negligence 
in a single opinion.254  In less than two pages, the court adopted modified 
comparative negligence, abandoned the last clear chance doctrine and joint 
and several liability, resolved statutory issues associated with abandoning 
contributory negligence, and even set forth suggested jury instructions for 
Tennessee trial courts to use.255 
The Court of Appeals is capable of resolving all the collateral issues 
implicated by a change to common law doctrine, like the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence.  However, the court need not simultaneously resolve 
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all the issues that may be implicated by a change in a common law doc-
trine.256  Even though a change in the common law doctrine of contributory 
negligence may affect other fundamental issues of negligence law, the court 
could resolve many of the ancillary issues as they arise on a “case-by-case 
basis.”257  When legislatures in other states change a common law doctrine 
by statute, they rarely “develop detailed frameworks for implementing the 
doctrine and resolving the issues that arise after its adoption.”258   
Critics may argue that it is antidemocratic for the Court of Appeals to 
change a common law doctrine and that change “should be made by a rep-
resentative branch of government.”259  However, this argument ignores the 
relationship between the legislature and the court with regard to the com-
mon law.  “Unlike judicial resolution of constitutional questions,” the Court 
of Appeals’s decision to change a common law doctrine can be “overturned 
or modified by the legislature.”260  If the legislature finds the court’s deci-
sion to modify the common law unwise, it still has the power to change it 
back by statute.261  If a court’s decision to change a common law doctrine is 
met with public animosity, the legislature still has the ability to remedy 
it.262 
Additionally, critics who argue that allowing the court to change the 
common law is antidemocratic forget the democratic checks on the judges 
who sit on the Maryland Court of Appeals.263  Unlike Supreme Court Jus-
tices, who are appointed for life, the judges on the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals are subject to potential removal by voters every ten years.264  Under 
the Maryland Constitution: 
The continuance in office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
subject to approval or rejection by the registered voters of the ap-
pellate judicial circuit from which he was appointed at the next 
general election following the expiration of one year from the 
date of the occurrence of the vacancy which he was appointed to 
fill, and at the general election next occurring every ten years 
thereafter.265 
This provision gives citizens the opportunity to directly remove judges 
on the Court of Appeals whom they are dissatisfied with every ten years.266  
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Therefore, any argument that allowing the Court of Appeals to change 
common law doctrines is antidemocratic is weak, because the judges on the 
Court of Appeals can be held accountable by voters similar to members of 
the General Assembly.267 
For the above reasons, the court should not defer to the legislature 
when considering a change to an uncodified, judicially created, common 
law doctrine.  When the court defers to the legislature, it perpetuates injus-
tices that it has the power to correct and should correct.268  Additionally, the 
court is competent to change common law doctrines and judicial action in 
such scenarios does not undermine democratic values.269 
C.  The Court Should Take Action and Change a Common Law 
Doctrine When It Finds the Doctrine Has Become “[U]nsound in 
the [C]ircumstances of [M]odern [L]ife”270 
Rather than waiting for the legislature to change outdated and unjust 
common law doctrines, the Court of Appeals should change the common 
law when, “in light of changed conditions or increased knowledge,” the 
“rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of 
the past, no longer suitable to our people.”271  To determine whether a 
common law doctrine has become “unsound in the circumstances of mod-
ern life,” the court should evaluate the original rationale for the common 
law doctrine and the current justifications offered for the rules continued 
use.272  In evaluating the original rationale and current justifications for a 
rule, the court should consider prior cases, cases from other jurisdictions, 
and the opinions of legal scholars.273  The court need not follow a prior de-
cision or continue to adhere to a common law doctrine when “its rationale 
no longer withstands ‘careful analysis.’”274 
In Bozman, the Court of Appeals evaluated the common law doctrine 
of interspousal immunity based on this criteria.275  The court noted that the 
original rationale for the doctrine of interspousal immunity was incompati-
ble with modern values because the rule was created based on the presumed 
legal identity of the husband and wife at common law.276  The court then 
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noted that there was no reasonable contemporary justification for prohibit-
ing a wife from suing her husband in tort.277  In addition, the court recog-
nized that forty-six other states had abrogated the doctrine of spousal im-
munity278 and that legal scholars and commentators almost unanimously 
favored the abrogation of the doctrine of spousal immunity.279  Therefore, 
the court deemed the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity “a 
vestige of the past, whose time has come and gone” and completely abro-
gated the rule.280 
D. The Court of Appeals Should Abandon the Doctrine of Contributory 
Negligence and Adopt Comparative Fault 
In Coleman, the court should have evaluated the common law doctrine 
of contributory negligence the same way the court in Bozman evaluated the 
common law doctrine of interspousal immunity.281  It should have looked at 
the original rationale for the rule and current justifications for its continued 
usage, rather than just punting the issue to the legislature.282  While the ma-
jority in Coleman deferred to the legislature, Judge Harrell, in his dissent, 
offers a thoughtful and rational analysis of contributory negligence.283  This 
Section will analyze and add to Judge Harrell’s dissent. 
1.  The Original Rationale for Contributory Negligence 
As Judge Harrell points out in his dissent in Coleman, there are two 
primary rationales underlying the creation and adoption of contributory 
negligence by most of the United States in the eighteenth century.  First, 
contributory negligence was seen by many state judges as necessary in or-
der “to protect the nations’ newly-developing industry from liability.”284  
The contributory negligence defense was “especially effective” at protect-
ing industry from suits because it allowed judges to dismiss plaintiffs’ legal 
claims “without allowing them to be heard or decided by juries whose natu-
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ral sympathies might have favored the injured consumer or worker at the 
expense of the corporate or other business defendant.”285 
The Illinois Supreme Court in Alvis, noted similar reasons for the na-
tions “swift and universal acceptance” of contributory negligence in the 
nineteenth century.286  In particular, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that 
courts desired to protect the “burgeoning” railroad industry from a public 
that saw railroads as “harmful entities with deep pockets.”287  The courts 
were particularly worried about personal injury suits brought by railroad 
employees against the railroad companies.288 
Second, many states adopted contributory negligence because of the 
prevailing sentiment at the time that a plaintiff’s failure to account for his 
own safety nullified any fault that could be attributed to the defendant.289  
The popular idea at the time was that a plaintiff should enter the court with 
“clean hands” and that the “courts should not assist someone who contrib-
utes to causing his or her own injuries.”290 
Judge Harrell correctly points out that these original justifications for 
contributory negligence do not justify current use of the doctrine.291  Judge 
Harrell notes that modern industry is no longer “fledgling or so prone to 
withering at the prospect of liability” to justify protecting industry from lia-
bility in situations where a business is primarily at fault for an accident.292  
In addition, “tilting the scales to favor industry is inconsistent with modern 
conceptions of justice, which focus instead on proportional responsibility 
and fundamental fairness.”293 
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Alvis, similarly noted that the eight-
eenth-century fear that employee lawsuits would damage burgeoning indus-
try is no longer a reason to maintain contributory negligence.294  Today, 
most cases brought by an employee against an employer are brought “under 
the Worker’s Compensation Act, under which plaintiff’s negligence is not 
an issue.”295  Similarly, in Maryland, most cases brought by an employee 
against an employer would fall under the Maryland Workers Compensation 
                                                          
 285.  See DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., supra note 2, at 11. 
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Act.296  Thus, judicial concern about employee suits damaging nascent in-
dustry is no longer a legitimate justification for maintaining contributory 
negligence. 
Judge Harrell also notes that the second rationale, preventing at fault 
plaintiffs from recovery, is inconsistent with modern values.  Society’s 
modern understanding of justice has moved away from “‘all-or-nothing’ re-
covery rules” and towards allocating “the burden of liability among at-fault 
parties.”297  The doctrine of contributory negligence is at odds with our 
modern understanding of justice because it completely bars a contributorily 
negligent plaintiff from recovery, no matter how slight their fault, while al-
lowing the negligent defendant to get off scot-free, even when the defendant 
is primarily responsible for the injury.298  In contrast, comparative fault is a 
just rule that forces defendants to pay their fair share of the cost of an acci-
dent.  As the Illinois Supreme Court concluded in Alvis, “Under a compara-
tive negligence standard, the parties are allowed to recover the proportion of 
damages not attributable to their own fault. The basic logic and fairness of 
such apportionment is difficult to dispute.”299 
Perhaps the most striking example of injustice under Maryland’s con-
tributory negligence law occurred in Hensel v. Beckward.300  In Hensel, the 
plaintiff, who was driving at nighttime, came to a complete stop at a stop 
sign and looked both ways twice before proceeding into an “unilluminated 
intersection.”301  When the plaintiff’s vehicle entered the intersection, he 
was struck by the defendant’s vehicle, which was moving at “a fast rate of 
speed” with “unlit headlights.”302  The Court of Appeals found that the 
plaintiff, who was “permanently paralyzed from the neck down” as a result 
of the accident, was completely barred from recovery because he violated 
the Maryland “boulevard rule,” which requires that a driver yield the right 
of way to other vehicles approaching on a through highway.303  Because he 
violated the boulevard rule, the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law and thus barred from recov-
ery.304 
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2.  An Evaluation of the Current Justifications for the Continued 
Use of Contributory Negligence 
The current justifications for contributory negligence mostly focus on 
economic issues, in particular how a switch to comparative fault would af-
fect businesses, insurers, and local governments.305  In his dissent, Judge 
Harrell points out that “the array of Amici lined up in support of the contin-
uation of contributory negligence is populated by the entrenched and estab-
lished business interests who seek to maintain an economic advantage.”306  
Businesses, insurers and local governments in Maryland fear that the adop-
tion of comparative fault would broaden their potential tort liability and 
lead to higher insurance rates and defense costs.307  As a result, these groups 
submitted amicus briefs to the Court of Appeals in Coleman in order to op-
pose the potential abandonment of contributory negligence.308 
These groups threaten economic disaster, claiming a switch to com-
parative negligence will damage businesses and local governments by 
broadening their liability and raising insurance premiums.309  However, this 
argument overlooks the fact that forty-six states have adopted comparative 
negligence without disaster.310  Remarkably no state, since adopting a com-
parative fault system, has returned to contributory negligence.311  Addition-
ally, comparative negligence would not have significant economically ad-
verse effects on all businesses in Maryland.  It would only significantly 
affect businesses that negligently injure people.  Under a comparative neg-
ligence standard, negligently run businesses will pay higher premiums and 
face more claims due to their own lack of care.  Non-negligent, carefully 
run businesses will avoid liability.312  A rule that favors non-negligent, care-
fully run businesses is better than a rule that protects negligent, carelessly 
run businesses. 
Additionally, these concerns about the effects a switch to comparative 
would have on businesses does not outweigh the inherent unfairness of con-
tributory negligence.  Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., and Oscar S. 
Gray put it best in their textbook, The Law of Torts: 
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There is no justification- in either policy or doctrine- for the rule 
of contributory negligence, except for the feeling that if one per-
son is to be held liable because of fault, then the fault of the vic-
tim who seeks to enforce that liability should also be considered.  
But this notion does not require the all or nothing rule, which 
would exonerate a very negligent defendant for even the slightest 
fault of his victim.  A more nearly logical corollary of the fault 
principle would be a rule of comparative or proportional negli-
gence, not the traditional all-or-nothing rule.  And almost from 
the beginning there has been serious dissatisfaction with the Dra-
conian rule sired by a medieval concept of cause out of a heartless 
laissez faire.313 
Ultimately, Coleman is dissatisfying because the majority avoided the 
hard work of analyzing whether contributory negligence is a good rule and 
punted the issue down Rowe Boulevard to the General Assembly.  In the 
future, the court should instead look at the original rationale for the rule and 
analyze the current justifications for its continued use. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should abandon its current view that the court 
should not change the common law in the face of the General Assembly’s 
repeated refusal to do so.314  The repeated failure of bills in the General As-
sembly is a poor indicator of legislative intent.315  Moreover, the court 
should not defer to the legislature when it is considering a change to judi-
cially-created common law rules.316  The court is an appropriate forum for 
changing the common law, and the court should prevent injustices that it 
has the power to correct.317  When the Court of Appeals gets another chance 
to evaluate an outdated common law rule, it should evaluate the rational 
underpinnings of the rule and then take action if the rule is found to be un-
just, unfit, and ultimately “unsound in the circumstances of modern life.”318  
With regard to the doctrine of contributory negligence in particular, the 
court should take the first step and abandon a common law rule that is un-
just and unfit for Maryland.319 
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